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SUMMARY
We study timing effects of carbon mitigation and solar radiation manage-
ment (SRM) policies by introducing a general equilibrium framework with correlated
pollutants. We show that first-mover advantage exists in deciding both carbon e-
missions quotas and SRM levels, and levels of national carbon quotas, sulfur quotas
and SRM are positively correlated with each other. Moreover, we demonstrate that
national sensitivities to acid rain damages play important roles in governments’ en-
vironmental policies. With an example, we illustrate that if international equity is
considered, then governments could be willing to choose SRM levels before carbon
quotas since it yields higher payoffs and less acid rain and droughts damages. This




Over the years, people have been trying to relieve global warming by mitigating
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). However, so far, attempts in that direction
have been grossly unsuccessful. Therefore, artificial ways to modify the climate, or so-
called geo-engineering, have been rekindled by scientists. Among all, solar radiation
management (SRM) is one of the most promising technologies. It injects sulfate
aerosols into the stratosphere, which backscatter part of the solar radiation striking
the earth, thus reducing the temperature. They are also expected to stop the melting
of sea ice and land-based glaciers, slow sea level rise and increase the terrestrial
carbon sink. However, like any other technologies, it is a double-edged sword as well.
Problems such as droughts, ozone depletion, less sunlight for solar power and less
blue skies might emerge.[5] Our paper considers drought as an example of the damage
caused by SRM.
Moreover, in contrast to carbon abatement, geoengineering technologies are inex-
pensive and can be undertaken by a single nation, unilaterally.[1] This enables nations
to move strategically in making abatement and SRM policies, which causes a “moral
hazard” concern that some countries may emit more by using SRM as the last resort.
Literatures in economics have discussed from different angles possible mitigation reac-
tions in view of future implementation of geoengineering technologies. Moreno-Cruz
(2011)[4] considers the strategic interactions between both symmetric and asymmetric
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countries. For similar nations, he finds that the prospect of SRM will create greater
incentives for free-riding on carbon mitigation, while for asymmetric ones, it can in-
duce inefficiently high levels of mitigation. Urpelainen (2012)[6] also examines the
strategic logic of unilateral geoengineering. He finds that if geoengineering produces
severe negative externalities, it may spur deeper emissions reductions in the present.
If the externalities are not overly severe, unrestricted geoengineering can be globally
beneficial, which concludes from the comparisons of behavior and payoffs to coun-
tries with and without the technology. Millard-Ball (2012)[3] studies this issue by
focusing on the formation of a mitigation agreement. He shows that a credible threat
of unilateral geoengineering may instead strengthen global abatement and lead to a
self-enforcing climate treaty with full participation.
There are at least two common features of those papers. One is that they share a
common timing where carbon reductions are prior to geoengineering choices. Howev-
er, due to the much lower technology cost of geoengineering, it is not impossible that
some countries will be more willing to apply climate engineering than carbon miti-
gation. Hence, those nations may decide SRM levels before carbon emissions levels.
The second feature is that none of them has mentioned sulfur dioxide emissions which
cause acid rain damages. And yet, in effect, carbon policies should be closely related
to sulfur policies. Consider one of the key pollution emitters, the energy industry.
As first pointed out by Silva[2] , energy production process generates not only GHG
such as carbon dioxide, but also sulfur dioxide. Meanwhile, our model results confirm
that national carbon quota levels are affected by domestic sensitivities to acid rain
damage as well.
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Our paper takes into account those two missing points in the literature. We first
establish a general equilibrium framework with correlated pollutants, CO2 and SO2.
We assume that one unit of energy production emits one unit of CO2 and one unit of
SO2. Governments decide not only amounts of carbon emissions and SRM, but also
those of sulfur emissions. Note that by analyzing the general equilibrium, our model
is more realistic than current ones in one additional dimension as interactions in the
whole economy are considered. Next, we study and compare six games with different
timings in deciding carbon quotas and SRM levels. Specifically, we divide the games
into three categories: carbon quotas are chosen first, SRM levels are chosen first and
carbon and SRM levels are chosen simultaneously. For the first two categories, we
further distinguish each one by the fact that if or not there exists national leadership
in making the first-stage decisions. For the third category, we examine both uncoor-
dinated and coordinated games. We carry out our analysis by first assuming general
functional forms and then looking at a specific example.
Results of the general model exhibit positive correlations among levels of sulfur
permits, carbon permits and SRM. This implies that expectation of future SRM tech-
nology does increase current carbon emissions, confirming the public’s moral hazard
concern. Meanwhile, we demonstrate that there exist first-mover advantages in both
carbon quotas and SRM decisions. With the example, we verify that sulfur emissions
levels are linked to carbon emissions and SRM levels through both energy produc-
tion and national sensitivities to acid rain damages. In general, the more prone to
acid rain one nation is, the less carbon and sulfur pollutions it will produce, and the
less SRM is implemented. But all results are the opposite if the other nation suffers
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more from acid rain. Furthermore, our ranking of national payoffs shows that indeed,
countries may be more willing to determine SRM levels before carbon quotas as those
games generally yield higher utility for both nations. The ranking of environmental
damages presents the same tendency when nations care more about acid rain and
droughts than global warming.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the gen-






Consider a global economy consisting of two nations, indexed by j, j = 1, 2. For
simplicity, we normalize the population of each nation, letting it be equal to 1. Both
nations suffer from droughts caused by solar radiation management (SRM), global
warming caused by emissions of carbon dioxide and acid rain caused by emissions of
sulfur dioxide. Carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide emissions are by-products of energy
production in each nation.
Let HT (C,M) denote the harm function associated with global warming in each
nation, where C =
∑2
j=1Cj and M =
∑2
j=1Mj are global levels of carbon dioxide
and SRM, respectively. Let HAj (θj, Sj) be the harm function of acid rain deposition in
nation j, where Sj is the level of sulfur dioxide in nation j and θj ∈ (1, 2), ∀j = 1, 2
denotes its sensitivity to acid rain damage. The drought caused by SRM in each
nation is represented by HD(M). Assume that all harm functions are quadratic.
Moreover, HT increases in C and decreases in M (i.e., SRM is a public good). HAj
and HD are increasing functions. nation j’s total level of environmental damages is
Hj = Hj(C,M, Sj) = H
T (C,M) +HAj (θj, Sj) +H
D(M). (2.1)
A representative consumer in nation j consumes xj units of composite good (nu-
meraire), ej units of energy and is harmed by Hj units of environmental damages.
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Let uj(xj, ej, Hj) denote consumer j’s utility function. Assume that uj is quasi-linear
(linear in xj), strictly concave in ej and increasing in consumption of both composite
and energy goods. More precisely, we assume that uj(xj, ej, Hj) = xj + fj(ej)−Hj,




j(wj) > 0, f
′′
j < 0 for all ej > 0 and f
′′′
j = 0 for all ej ≥ 0.
The consumer’s income is denoted wj :
wj = xj + pCjQCj + pSjQSj + πj −KMj , (2.2)
where xj is an initial endowment of the numeraire good. Each consumer is as-
signed carbon and sulfur quotas by his/her national government and receives rev-
enue, pCjQCj + pSjQSj from sales of the permits to the domestic energy industry
(where pCj and pSj are prices of carbon and sulfur permits in nation j, respective-
ly). He/she also earns profits of the energy industry in nation j, πj, and pays a
tax equal to the public expenditure on SRM in nation j, KMj . The government of
nation j makes decisions on national quantities of carbon and sulfur quotas to be
issued, QCj and QSj and the level of SRM, Mj, to be provided. For future reference,
note that C ≡ QC1 + QC2 ≡ QC , M1 + M2 ≡ M and Sj = QSj , j = 1, 2. Through-
out, we assume that markets are competitive, with both consumers and energy firms
taking prices as given. Consumers also take their incomes and the levels of pollution
damages as given.
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2.2 General Equilibrium Framework with Correlated Pol-
lutants
The goal of consumer j is to maximize uj(xj, ej, Hj) = xj +fj(ej)−Hj by choosing
non-negative {xj, ej}, subject to xj + pejej = wj, where pej is nation j’senergy price.
This is equivalent to choosing non-negative ej to maximize fj(ej)− pejej. Assuming
interior solutions, the first-order condition is:
f ′j(ej)− pej = 0. (2.3)
Condition (2.3) informs us that the optimal level of energy to be consumed is the
one at which the marginal utility from energy equates the price of energy. Since the
second-order condition is f ′′j (ej) < 0, the solution to the consumer’s maximization
problem is unique. Equation (2.3) implicitly defines ej(pej), consumer j’s energy
demand. The demand for the numeraire good is xj(pej , wj) = wj − pejej(pej). Thus,




− Hj is consumer j’s indirect utility
function.
In nation j, the energy firm’s profit function is
πj(Ej, RCj , RSj) = pejEj−pCj(Ej−RCj)−pSj(Ej−RSj)−KEj (Ej)−KCj (RCj)−KSj (RCj),
where Ej, RCj , RSj are levels of energy production, carbon dioxide reduction and




j are the corresponding costs of energy
production and pollution abatement, and are all increasing and strictly convex. Each
firm chooses non-negative {Ej, RCj , RSj} to maximize πj, taking all prices as given.
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The first-order conditions for interior solutions are as follows:












Condition (2.4a) informs us that the optimal amount of energy to be produced in a
nation should equate the marginal revenue to the sum of marginal production and
regulatory costs of energy production. Equation (2.4b) states that the optimal level
of carbon abatement should equate the marginal revenue from carbon abatement (i.e.,
the marginal cost saving in expenditure on carbon permits) to the marginal cost of
carbon abatement. Equation (2.4c) is similar; it equates marginal revenue from sulfur
abatement to the marginal cost of sulfur abatement.
We have also verified that the Hessian matrix is negative definite, which implies
strict concavity of the profit function and ensures a unique solution to the maximiza-
tion problem. We can, therefore, invoke the implicit function theorem and define
the decision variables of the energy industry from equations (2.4a) to (2.4c) as1 :





























1See the derivation in Appendix A.1.
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Firm j’s indirect profit function is
πj(pej , pCj , pSj) = Ej(pej , pCj , pSj)[pej − pCj − pSj ] + pCjRCj(pCj)
+ pSjRSj(pSj)−KEj
(










Market-clearing conditions for the national energy market, and carbon and sulfur
quota markets, respectively, are as follows:
ej(pej) = Ej(pej , pCj , pSj), (2.6a)
Ej(pej , pCj , pSj)−RCj(pCj) = QCj , (2.6b)
Ej(pej , pCj , pSj)−RSj(pSj) = QSj , (2.6c)
Condition (2.6a) informs us that in each nation the demand for energy must be equal
to the supply of energy. Condition (2.6b) states that in each nation, the demand for
carbon permits must be equal to the supply of carbon permits. Condition (2.6c) is
similar to condition (2.6b): the demand for sulfur permits equals the supply of sulfur
permits.
Since the Jacobian matrix associated with the system of equations (2.6) is non-
singular, we can invoke the implicit function theorem to define the following implicit
functions:2 pej(QCj , QSj), pCj(QCj , QSj), and pSj(QCj , QSj). The following results
2See Appendix A.2 for the proof.
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< 0, ∀j = 1, 2.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
To illustrate the intuition behind the proposition, let us analyze how prices change
when QCj changes. If QCj increases, pCj decreases. This is expected since the de-
mand for carbon permits is decreasing in the carbon permit price and the supply of
permits is perfectly inelastic. The decreasing in the carbon permit price reduces the
firm’s marginal regulatory cost, holding all other prices constant, increasing the firm’s
marginal revenue from energy production. Thus, the firm has an initial incentive to
respond by increasing energy production and associated carbon and sulfur emissions,
with a subsequent shift in the firm’s demand curve for sulfur emission permits to the
right. Given an inelastic supply of sulfur permits, the shift in the demand for sulfur
permits results in an increase in the price of the sulfur permit. The increase in the
price of the sulfur permit more than offsets the decrease in the price of the carbon
permit, leading to an overall increase in the marginal regulatory cost. Thus, the firm’s
energy supply curve shifts in, leading to a contraction in the equilibrium energy level
and an increase in the energy price. Therefore, the existence of a limit on the supply
of sulfur permits leads to an overall net increase in the cost of producing energy when
the supply of carbon permits is expanded. This effect would not be present if there
was no regulation on sulfur emissions.
We are now ready to write consumer j’s indirect utility as function of pollution
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quotas and SRM provision levels:
vj
(
QCj , QC−j, QSj ,Mj,M−j
)












































and M = Mj +M−j, j = 1, 2.
Throughout the paper, we define −j = 1 if j = 2 and −j = 2 if j = 1.
2.3 Games on Environmental Policies in the Presence of
SRM
We now examine the effects of the timing of environmental policy. We consider
sequential policy games in order to compare the effects of committing to a policy of
setting the quota on carbon emissions with the effects of committing to a policy of
setting the level of SRM to be provided. In all games, we assume that the national
governments select their sulfur quotas at the last stage.
We establish two benchmarks under which policy making on carbon quotas and
SRM levels occur simultaneously in the first stage of two-stage games: (i) uncoordi-
nated policy making; and (ii) coordinated policy making. Sulfur quotas are chosen
simultaneously in the second stage of the game. The benchmarks will enable us to
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capture both the effects caused by the timing of policy making and the effects caused
by non-cooperative behavior (i.e., departures from socially efficient behavior). The
next two sequential games involve simultaneous choices of either (iii) pollution quotas
or (iv) SRM levels in the first stage, with simultaneous choices of either SRM (in game
(iii)) or pollution quotas (in game (iv)) in the second stage. Thus, unlike the games
in which pollution quotas and SRM are chosen simultaneously, games (iii) and (iv)
involve three stages, since sulfur quotas are simultaneously chosen in the third stage
of the game. The last two sequential games involve four stages. In game (v), nation 1
chooses its pollution quota in the first stage, nation 2 chooses its pollution quota in
the second stage, SRM levels are chosen simultaneously in the third stage and sulfur
quotas are chosen simultaneously in the fourth stage. In game (vi), nation 1 chooses
its SRM level in the first stage, nation 2 chooses its SRM level in the second stage,
carbon quotas are chosen simultaneously in the third stage and sulfur quotas are cho-
sen simultaneously in the fourth stage. The equilibrium concept utilized is subgame
perfection.
Consider the last stage of any sequential game, namely, the stage in which the
nations choose sulfur quotas simultaneously after having observed the other policy
choices, {QCj , QC−j ,Mj,M−j}. The optimization problem faced by nation j’s gov-
ernment is to choose non-negative {QSj} to maximize the national indirect utility






= 0, ∀j = 1, 2. (2.9)
Condition (2.9) informs us that the amount of sulfur quotas should be set at the
level that equates the national permit price to the national marginal damage caused
by acid rain. Since HAj is strictly convex, the sufficient second order is satisfied in
each maximization problem. Applying the implicit function theorem to each equa-





















) , j = 1, 2 (2.10)
By (1) and strict convexity of HAj , we have ∂QSj/∂QCj > 0, j = 1, 2. This important
result is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In each nation, the sulfur quota increases with the carbon quota.
We now examine the conditions that determine the optimal choices in the previous
stages of the various games, starting with the game in which the nations simultane-
ously and non-cooperatively choose carbon quotas and SRM levels.
3See derivations in Appendix A.4.
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2.3.1 Game I: Simultaneous Choices of Carbon Quotas and SRM Levels
In the first stage, the government of nation j chooses non-negative {QCj ,Mj} to




, taking {QC−j ,M−j} as given. Assum-















Condition (2.11a) reveals that the carbon quota in nation j should be set at the level
that equates the national carbon permit price to the national marginal damage of
global warming. Condition (2.11b) is similar in spirit, since the level of SRM that
should be provided at nation j is the one under which the national marginal benefit
from SRM provision — left side of (2.11b) — is equal to the national marginal cost
— right side of (2.11b). The national marginal cost is the sum of the marginal cost
of provision and the marginal damage caused by droughts in nation j.













































which implies that the direct effect of PCj on QCj is greater than the indirect effect.
Condition (2.13) implies that (2.12a) is negative. It then follows that the sufficient
second order conditions are satisfied in each maximization problem because the Hes-
sian matrix of second order terms is negative definite. Hence, the equilibrium for the
first stage is unique.
2.3.2 Game II: Simultaneous Choices of Carbon Quotas and SRM Levels
(Coordianted)
There exists an international agency simultaneously determining carbon pollution
quotas and SRM levels for both nations in the first stage of the game. It takes into
account the best response function of QSj described by equation (2.10) and selects
non-negative {QC1 , QC2 ,M1,M2} to maximize global indirect utility V = v1 + v2,
where v1 and v2 correspond to function (2.8) by setting j = 1, 2, respectively.
















Condition (2.14a) tells us that the amount of carbon quotas in nation j is chosen
to equate the national carbon permit price to the social marginal damage of global
warming. Condition (2.14b) means the similar: nation j should implement SRM at a
level that equalizes the domestic marginal cost of SRM to the social marginal damage
of droughts.
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The second-order conditions are satisfied given our assumptions and therefore,
there exists a unique solution to the international agency’s maximization problem.
2.3.3 Game III: Simultaneous Choices of Carbon Quotas
The two nations make their own decisions on carbon quotas simultaneously before
those on SRM levels. That is, in the second stage, the government of nation j chooses
non-negative Mj to maximize its indirect utility function (2.8), subject to (2.10) and
taking M−j as given. Assuming interior solutions, the first-order condition is the same
as equation (2.11b) in Game I (2.3.1). The second-order conditions are also satisfied
under our assumptions. Then we can define Mj(QC) implicitly from condition (2.11b)
by differentiating the equation with respect to QC , which yields the slope of the best




























Given our assumptions, we can easily get
∂Mj
∂QC
> 0, ∀j = 1, 2 (2.16)
In the first stage, government j maximizes national indirect utility function (2.8) by
selecting QCj , subject to (2.10) and (2.15), taking QC−j as given. This yields the
















Condition (2.17) demonstrates the tangency condition of how to determine the amoun-














with the slope of best response function of the other nation, dM−j/dQC .

































































then the second-order condition is satisfied. Hence, the solution to the government’s
maximization problem is unique.
2.3.4 Game IV: Simultaneous Choices of SRM levels
Now, the two nations decide their own SRM levels simultaneously before car-
bon permits levels. That is, in the second stage, government j selects non-negative
QCj to maximize its indirect utility function (2.8), subject to (2.10) and taking
{QC−j ,Mj,M−j} as given. The first-order condition is the same as equation (2.11a)
in the uncoordinated simultaneous game. Satisfaction of the second-order condition
enables us to implicitly define QCj(M) from (2.11a) by differentiating both sides with
18





















































Given our assumptions, we can easily verify that
∂QCj
∂M
> 0, ∀j = 1, 2 (2.19)
Summarizing our findings about the relationship between the level of SRM and carbon
quotas from (2.16) and (2.19), we reach the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In sequential games, if both nations’ amounts of carbon quotas are
decided before their SRM levels, then the level of SRM in each nation increases in the
global amount of carbon quotas. Conversely, if the nations’ amounts of carbon quotas
are chosen first, then the level of SRM in each country increases in the global amount
of carbon quotas.
In the first stage, each national government determines its level of SRM implemen-
tation to maximize its indirect utility, subject to (2.11a) and (2.18), and taking the
other nation’s choice as given. Assuming interior solutions, the first-order condition















Just like equation (2.17) of game III, equation (2.20) also represents a tangency
condition for deciding the level of SRM in each nation: the slope of iso-utility curve
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of nation j, −
(
dKMj /dMj + ∂H
T/∂M + dHT/dM
)
is set equal to that of the best


























































then the second-order condition is satisfied, which ensures a unique solution to the
maximization problem.
2.3.5 Game V: National Leadership in Carbon Quotas
Compared with game III (2.3.3), now one nation 1 acts strategically by moving
first in deciding its national carbon quota. The behavior of both nations in the last
two stages is the same as in game III. In the second stage, nation 2 determines QC2
by taking QC1 as given and taking into account the last two stages’ best response
functions. The first- and second-order conditions are the same as in the first stage of
























In the first stage, nation 1 takes into account the reactions in all later stages and
chooses its amount of carbon quotas to maximize its national indirect utility. The































−1 equals the slope of nation 2’s best response
function, ∂QC2/∂QC1 .
Moreover, we can prove that the second-order condition is satisfied given our
assumptions. Hence, the maximization problem has a unique solution.
2.3.6 Game VI: National Leadership in SRM Levels
Compared with game IV (2.3.4), now nation 1 acts strategically by moving first in
deciding its national SRM level. The behavior of both nations in the last two stages
is the same as in game IV. In the second stage, nation 2 chooses M2 to maximize
its indirect utility, subject to (2.11a) and (2.18) and considering M1 as given. After
checking the first- and second-order conditions, we use implicit function theorem to


















In the first stage, nation 1 determines M1 to maximize its indirect utility and takes
into account all the reactions in later stages. This results in the first-order condition
21





















Condition (2.26) is also a tangency condition for determining M1: equating the slope

















with the slope of nation 2’s best response function, dM2/dM1.
We have checked that the second-order condition is satisfied under our assump-
tions. Hence, there exists a unique solution to the maximization problem.
2.4 First-mover Advantage
Since we have considered strategic movements in games V (2.3.5) and VI (2.3.6),
we examine if there exists a first-mover advantage in deciding the national carbon








from (2.22), (2.25), (2.27) and (2.28), we conclude that QC1 and QC2 , M1 and M2,
are two pairs of strategic substitutes. Meanwhile, we can see that they are also two
pairs of substitutes because vj decreases in both QC−j and M−j. Then according to
Varian[7], we have the following proposition.
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Proposition 4. There exist first-mover advantages in terms of choices of both carbon
quotas and SRM levels.





In this section, we assign specific functional forms to the utility, cost and harm
functions. The equilibrium results verify the existence of first-mover advantage in
terms of carbon and SRM policies. Moreover, we show that for all games, if a nation
is more sensitive to acid rain damage, then it will issue less carbon quotas, implement
less SRM and enjoy lower utility. The cross effects, i.e. impacts of the other nation’s
sensitivity to acid rain damage on a nation’s indirect utility, have all results in the
opposite direction. Hence, the knowledge of θ1 and θ2 will enable us to make some
predictions about their movements. This also demonstrates that policies on sulfur are
linked to those on carbon and therefore on SRM not only through energy production,
but also through θ’s . In addition, we compare national payoffs and environmental
damages in different games so as to predict which one would be the relevant Nash
equilibrium in reality.
Suppose that
uj ≡ xj + ej(1− ej/2), KEj ≡ E2j /2, KCj ≡ R2Cj/2,
KSj ≡ R2Sj/2, K
M
j ≡M2j /2, HT ≡ (C −M)2/2,
HD ≡M2/2. HAj ≡ θjS2j /2 and xj = 0, ∀j = 1, 2.
24
Solving consumer j’s and producer j’s maximization problems, the general equilibri-
um results in nation j are as follows:


































1 +QCj − 3QSj
)
∀j = 1, 2











Now, we solve the governments’ maximization problems in different games using
25
function (3.1). The Nash equilibria are as follows:
QICj =
10 + 7θj + 18θ−j + 15θjθ−j
56 + 81 (θj + θ−j) + 117θjθ−j
QISj =
22 + 33θ−j
56 + 81 (θj + θ−j) + 117θjθ−j
M Ij =
4 + 5(θj + θ−j) + 6θjθ−j
56 + 81 (θj + θ−j) + 117θjθ−j
QIICj =
18 + 8θj + 37θ−j + 27θjθ−j
156 + 224 (θj + θ−j) + 321θjθ−j
QIISj =
58 + 87θ−j
156 + 224 (θj + θ−j) + 321θjθ−j
M IIj =
8 + 10 (θj + θ−j) + 12θjθ−j
156 + 224 (θj + θ−j) + 321θjθ−j
QIIICj =
50 + 36θj + 89θ−j + 75θjθ−j
268 + 388 (θj + θ−j) + 561θjθ−j
QIIISj =
53 (θj + θ−j)
268 + 388 (θj + θ−j) + 561θjθ−j
M IIIj =
20 + 25 (θj + θ−j) + 30θjθ−j
268 + 388 (θj + θ−j) + 561θjθ−j
QIVCj =























(2 + 3θ−j) [164 + 236 (θj + θ−j) + 339θjθ−j ]







































6364 + 5664θ1 + 18854θ2 + 17104θ1θ2 + 14011θ2
2 + 12961θ1θ2
2




2836 + 5746θ2 + 5836θ1 + 13071θ1θ2 + 2364θ2
2 + 6689θ1θ2
2




9164 + 26554θ2 + 19261θ2
2




7988 + 12276θ1 + 11534θ2 + 17693θ1θ2




5 (92 + 131θ2) [4 + 5 (θ1 + θ2) + 6θ1θ2]




5 (92 + 131θ2) [4 + 5 (θ1 + θ2) + 6θ1θ2]












MVI1 = F5/F M
VI
2 = F6/F
where QiCj , Q
i
Sj
,M ij , i = I,II,. . . ,VI, j = 1, 2 denotes the levels of carbon quotas,
sulfur quotas and SRM of nation j in game i, and



















































































































































































































































































5520 + 24456θ1 + 23352θ2 + 103460θ1θ2 + 36096θ
2
1





























We have checked that all of those solutions are interior and the corresponding
prices and levels of pollution reduction are all positive. This indicates that in all
games, carbon mitigation and SRM are not perfect substitutes. Governments’ optimal
choices always consist of a portfolio of the two instruments. Substituting those results
into function (3.1), we can obtain nation j’s payoff in game i, denoted by vij, where
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i = I,II,. . . ,VI and j = 1, 2. Assume in the sequel that nation 1 is the leader in games
V and VI.
3.1 First-mover Advantage
To examine whether quantity leadership leads to higher national payoffs, we com-
pare nation 1’s payoffs in games where it is the leader in making environmental policies








The result confirms the existence of first-mover advantages in both carbon mitigation
and SRM decisions.
3.2 Comparative Statics with respect to θ’s
Next, we further study how the advantages are affected by the two nations’ sen-

























Hence, a nation is more desirable to commit on either carbon quotas or SRM imple-
mentation if it suffers less from acid rain damage. If the other nation suffers more, it
will be more desirable to move first in choosing carbon quotas but not SRM levels.















∀i = I,II,. . . ,VI and ∀j = 1, 2.
These results show that environmental policies on carbon mitigation and SRM im-
plementation are correlated with those on sulfur reduction not only through the link
in energy production, but also through national sufferings from acid rain damages.
3.3 Rankings of Global and National Payoffs
Considering the promising technology of SRM, what timing strategies will utility-
maximizing nations take in making environmental policies? To explore the answer,
we compare global and national payoffs of the six games. The results are in listed in
Table (B4) in the Appendix.
We can see that the coordinated game yields the highest utilities for both the
leader and the follower, and thereby the global one. However, as it would not be
surprising to see that countries may fail to cooperate in reality, let’s look at the
comparisons among games I (2.3.1) and III (2.3.3) to VI (2.3.6).
We can observe that for all payoff comparisons, games I and III are strictly dom-
inated by games IV and VI. Next, if the leader in deciding carbon quotas has large
enough bargaining power, then game V is the potential equilibrium. If not, then
since the follower loses too much in game V, it would not be the relevant equilibrium
considering equity. Rather, game IV would be the potential one if the follower in
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making SRM policy can bribe the leader or logrolling is possible. Otherwise, the
equilibrium could only be game VI which is the second-best for both nations. These
results demonstrate that nations would not like to determine mitigation levels first as
long as international equity is taken into account. This is known by forward-looking
governments and so, they would take strategic timing by choosing SRM levels first
rather than follow the technological timing as claimed by all the previous economic
literatures.
3.4 Rankings of Environmental Damages
We have also listed a ranking of the levels of environmental damages in Table (B4)
in the Appendix. An interesting observation is that the coordinated game produces
the least damages of acid rain and global warming, but not that of the drought. This
is because the optimal policy takes into account both positive and negative external-
ities of SRM, and thereby the SRM level is not the lowest. On the other hand,
acid rain or global warming is either pure local bad or pure public bad, and so their
levels are set to the minimal when payoff is the highest in the coordinated game.
Moreover, note that games where carbon amounts are determined before SRM levels
(games III and V) generally yield higher damages of both acid rain and droughts,
but lower damages of global warming than games where SRM levels are chosen first
(games IV and VI). Hence, in terms of the environment, it depends on the different
weights governments put on the three damages to determine which decision is the
first, mitigation or SRM. If nations are more concerned with acid rain or drought,
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then in general they will strategically choose SRM levels before carbon quotas, which




This paper represents an initial trial of economic papers on geoengineering to
study timing effects of mitigation and SRM policies via a general equilibrium model
with correlated pollutants. We have proved the existence of first-mover advantage in
choosing carbon quotas and SRM levels as well as the positive quantity relationship
among sulfur permits, carbon permits and SRM. Moreover, nations’ sensitivities to
acid rain damage play important roles in governments’ environmental policies. We
have also shown that the cases where SRM levels are chosen first cannot be neglected
as they may yield higher global and national payoffs with less acid rain and droughts
damages.
Future work may incorporate uncertainties and asymmetric information in nation-
al costs and damages of SRM into the model. Meanwhile, we can apply the correlate
pollutants framework to examining governance issues on geoengineering, which has




A.1 Derivation of Implicit Functions of Ej, RCj , RSj in terms
of Pej , PCj , PSj
By implicit function theorem, we have:
Ej ≡ Ej(Pej , PCj , PSj)
RCj ≡ RCj(Pej , PCj , PSj)
and
RSj ≡ RSj(Pej , PCj , PSj)
Plugging those relationships back into conditions (2.4) and differentiating each new

















































and thereby obtain equations (2.5).
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A.2 Derivation of Implicit Price Functions Pej , PCj , PSj in
terms of QCj , QSj
Since Pej ≡ Pej(QCj , QSj), PCj ≡ PCj(QCj , QSj), and PSj ≡ PSj(QCj , QSj), dif-






















































































































































∣∣∣∣∣∣ dejdPej − ∂Ej∂Pej
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We get signs of those partial derivatives directly from assumptions on concavity
of the utility function and convexity of cost functions.
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A.4 Derivation of the First-order Condition (2.9)





















































































Combining equations (A.2), (2.3) and (2.4), we have:
∂vj
∂QSj






























































Table B1: Descriptions of the Games
Time Descriptions
Simulations The four choices, both nations’ carbon quotas
and SRM levels, are made simultaneously.
1) Uncoordinated Carbon quotas and SRM levels are uncoordi-
nated between the two nations, respectively.
2) Coordinated Carbon quotas and SRM levels are coordinated
between the two nations, respectively.
Sequential
No National Leadership
3) 1st Stage: Carbon Quotas Nations decide carbon quotas simultaneously
in the 1st stage and choose SRM levels simul-
taneously in the 2nd stage.
4) 1st Stage: SRM Levels Nations choose SRM levels simultaneously in
the 1st stage and decide carbon quotas simul-
taneously in the 2nd stage.
National Leadership
5) 1st Stage:
Nation 1’s Carbon Quotas
In the 1st stage, nation 1 decides its carbon
quota, followed by nation 2’s carbon decision
in the 2nd stage. Both nations choose SRM
levels simultaneously in the 3rd stage.
6) 1st Stage:
Nation 1’s SRM Level
In the 1st stage, nation 1 chooses its SRM lev-
el, followed by nation 2’s SRM choice in the
2nd stage. Both nations decide carbon quotas
simultaneously in the 3rd stage.
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Table B2: First-order Conditions of the Games
Timing QC1 QC2
Simultaneous
1) Uncoordinated PC1 −
∂HT
∂QC












































4) 1st Stage: SRM Levels PC1 −
∂HT
∂QC








































Nation 1’s SRM Level PC1 −
∂HT
∂QC




























































































































































Table B3: Slopes of Best Response Functions of Sequential Games
without National Leadership

































































Table B4: Rankings of the Payoffs and Environmental Damages
Rankings 1 2 3 4 5 6
V V III I VI IV II
v1 III I IV VI V II
v2 V III I VI IV II
A1 II VI IV I III V
A2 II V VI IV I III
D VI IV II I III V
T II I III IV V VI
Note: V global welfare
v1 nation 1’s payoff
v2 nation 2’s payoff
A1 nation 1’s acid rain level
A2 nation 2’s acid rain level
D global level of droughts
T global level of global warming
“6” stands for the largest in the ranking
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